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Private LLM deployment: who controls what

On-premises LLM deployment, colocation, dedicated GPU capacity and managed APIs each place the hardware, facility, data, model weights, logs and operations with different parties.

Cover of the full report: Private LLM deployment: who controls what
The research behind this article, with every source listed. 20 pages.

Key points

From the Summary of the full report

  1. NIST's 2011 cloud definition calls a cloud private when its infrastructure is provisioned for one organization, whether that organization, a third party or both own, manage and operate it, and whether it sits on or off premises [1]. NIST's 2012 guidance splits private clouds into on-site and outsourced variants, which differ in who builds the security perimeter [2].
  2. On a managed model API, the provider runs the hardware, the facility and the model, and the customer chooses among documented settings for processing location, retention and its own request logs [6, 9, 10, 13]. On Azure, the Global and DataZone deployment types change only where prompts are processed, and data at rest stays in the customer's chosen geography [6].
  3. By default, four managed model services may keep prompts to detect abuse: Azure, Amazon Bedrock, Google Cloud's managed model platform and one model developer's API [6, 9, 13, 14]. That developer's API keeps abuse monitoring logs for up to 30 days unless longer retention is required by law or needed to prevent harm [14]. On Amazon Bedrock, some model families require human review by AWS, and prompts and completions for those are kept for up to 30 days [9]. Keeping prompts out of the abuse monitoring store, called modified abuse monitoring, takes an approval on Azure and on that developer's API [6, 7, 14].

On-premises LLM deployment puts a large language model on servers in a building the organization controls. It is one of several ways to run a model privately, beside colocation space, dedicated GPU capacity and dedicated tenancy in a public cloud, with a managed model API as the baseline. Each option places the hardware, the facility, the data, the model weights, the logs and day-to-day operations with a different mix of parties.

NIST's definition shows why the word private settles little on its own. A private cloud is provisioned for exclusive use by one organization, and it "may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises" [1]. What separates the options is who owns the servers, who runs the building and who operates the stack.

What "private" means for an LLM

NIST's 2012 guidance splits private clouds into two variants because they "affect the security perimeter" [2]. In an on-site private cloud, the organization builds the perimeter, and the perimeter exists only if it does [2]. An outsourced private cloud has two perimeters, the consumer's and the provider's, joined by a protected link, and the provider accepts responsibility for keeping the private resources apart from other cloud resources [2]. NIST adds a test: an outsourced arrangement that separates customers only with the normal public cloud mechanisms, such as hardware virtualization and VLANs, "would essentially become the public cloud scenario" [2]. Dedicated Instances on Amazon EC2 run on hardware dedicated to one AWS account, though their EBS volumes do not run on single-tenant hardware [16].

The service model sets how far the customer's control reaches. An IaaS consumer "should assume full responsibility for the guest OS's, while the IaaS provider controls the host OS" [3]. AWS calls the same split shared responsibility: it protects the hardware, software, networking and facilities, and the customer's share depends on the services it selects [4].

Who controls what in each option

Option Hardware Facility Model weights Logs Operations Sources
Managed model API Provider Provider Provider Provider's abuse logs, plus the customer's own if enabled Provider [6, 9, 10, 13, 14]
Dedicated tenancy in a public cloud Provider's hosts, dedicated to one account Provider Customer, in its instances Customer, in its instances Provider below the guest OS, customer above [3, 4, 16]
Provider hardware on your premises Owned and managed by the provider Customer Set by the service Set by the service Provider [17]
Your servers, your facility Customer Customer Customer Customer, as set in its serving software Customer or its contractor [2, 28, 29]
Your servers in colocation Customer Colocation operator Customer Customer Customer or its contractor [18]
Dedicated GPU capacity GPU cloud, under contract A facility the GPU cloud leases Set by contract Set by contract GPU cloud for the hardware [2, 19]

The table is a reading of the documents cited.

LLM on-premises vs cloud: what a managed API keeps

On a managed model API, the provider holds the hardware, the facility and the model, and the customer holds settings. On Azure, prompts and completions on Foundry Models sold by Azure are not available to the model providers [6]. A Global or DataZone deployment changes only where prompts are processed, and data at rest, including the abuse monitoring store, stays in the customer-designated geography [6]. On Amazon Bedrock, each model provider has one deployment account in each Region where Bedrock is available, owned and operated by the Bedrock service team, and model providers have no access to those accounts [8].

Retention differs by service. One model developer's API keeps abuse monitoring logs for up to 30 days unless longer retention is required by law or needed to prevent harm, and modified abuse monitoring takes prior approval [14]. On Bedrock, the default mode lets AWS retain data for safety and abuse prevention, and a zero data retention mode writes no request or response data to durable storage [9]. Some model families there require human review by AWS, and prompts and completions for those are kept for up to 30 days [9]. On Azure, when abuse indicators are detected, a sample of prompts and completions may be reviewed by automated means and, as necessary, by authorized employees. Approved customers can opt out of storage and human review [6, 7]. Google Cloud's managed model platform may log prompts to detect abuse, and its default cache is deleted no later than 24 hours after it is written [13].

The customer's own logs are a switch. Bedrock's model invocation logging is off by default, and once on, it can hold full requests and responses [10]. The cost side of this choice is worked through in Self-hosted LLM vs API cost: a break-even method.

On-premises LLM deployment on your own servers

Running the model on your own servers moves every column of the table to you, along with NIST's on-site costs: equipment paid for up front and a fixed capacity sized to expected workloads [2]. It also moves the serving software's defaults. The documentation of vLLM, an open-source serving engine, says traffic between the nodes of a multi-node deployment is insecure by default and must be protected by placing the nodes on an isolated network, and its API key option covers only some endpoint paths [28]. Its request logging is off by default, and it records prompt inputs only at the DEBUG log level [29].

The weights arrive as files that need checks. Hugging Face warns that loading a pickle file can allow arbitrary code execution, and pickle is the default format for PyTorch weights [27]. Joint guidance from April 2024 asks deployers to confirm each artifact's origin and integrity with digital signatures and checksums, and to inspect imported pre-trained models in a secure development zone first [24]. The license comes with the weights: one open-weight model family's community license requires a licensee whose products had more than 700 million monthly active users in the month before the licensed version's 23 July 2024 release date to request a license [32]. Sizing the servers is a separate calculation, set out in How much GPU memory LLM inference needs.

On premises does not settle who owns the hardware. AWS Outposts racks sit in a customer-managed building. Their racks, servers, switches and cabling are owned and managed by AWS, which operates, monitors and manages the capacity as part of an AWS Region [17].

Colocation and dedicated GPU capacity

Colocation keeps the hardware yours and the building someone else's. One colocation operator's 2025 annual report says its offerings are typically billed on the space and power a customer consumes, under a fixed duration contract [18]. It also describes an around-the-clock on-site service in which its technicians install and troubleshoot customer equipment [18]. Who may touch the servers is a contract term.

Dedicated GPU capacity adds a third party. One GPU cloud's 2025 annual report says customers generally buy a specified amount of capacity on a take-or-pay basis under multi-year committed contracts, with a weighted-average duration of approximately five years at 31 December 2025 [19]. It leases or licenses its data center space and states that it does not control the operation of those facilities [19]. NIST's outsourced private cloud is the closest of its models: two perimeters, a protected link, and startup costs that include negotiating the service level agreement but no server-side equipment [2].

Rillor deploys and operates the same private environment on your servers, in your colocation space or on dedicated GPU capacity it sources and contracts for you, and in each option your data, model weights and logs stay in your environment.

Air-gapped options from cloud vendors

A disconnected install removes the network link and keeps the vendor. Google Cloud's documentation says Google Distributed Cloud air-gapped needs no connectivity to Google Cloud, arrives as integrated racks delivered to the customer's premises, and takes software on a portable storage device with a checksum to verify it [20]. In August 2025, Google Cloud announced a commercial model family as a fully managed endpoint on that platform, in a customer or partner data center [22]. Who carries each update across the gap, and who checks it, are questions to settle in the agreement.

Questions to settle before choosing

The joint guidance is written for organizations that deploy and operate systems developed by another entity, and it is most applicable on premises or in private cloud environments [24]. Its practices become questions to settle where the organization runs the model, and to put to the provider where it does not:

  • Roles. Who is accountable for each part, and where do the environment's security boundaries sit [24]?
  • Weights. Who can reach them? The guidance asks for access control under two-person control and two-person integrity, and for isolated weight storage [24].
  • Keys. Are weights, outputs and logs encrypted at rest, with keys in a hardware security module [24]?
  • Logs. Do they cover inputs, outputs, intermediate states and errors, and which party keeps them [24]?
  • Updates. Is each new model version fully evaluated for accuracy, performance and security before it is redeployed [24]?
  • Third parties. NIST AI 600-1 suggests an inventory of every third party with access to organizational content, and vendor contracts that assign responsibility for incidents [25].

When agents call tools inside the environment, the same questions reach their credentials and audit trails, which MCP access control: scoped credentials, allow-lists and audit logs covers.

Read the full report

The full report adds the matrix's data column, a retention table for five managed services, the air-gapped row, confidential computing and its measured cost in one setup, and all 33 sources.

The full report

Private LLM deployment: who controls what

The research behind this article, with every source listed. 20 pages.

  1. Summary
  2. Background
  3. Method
  4. Findings
  5. Implications
  6. Limits of this analysis
  7. Sources

Sources

  1. The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NIST Special Publication 800-145. Peter Mell and Timothy Grance, National Institute of Standards and Technology, September 2011, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf
  2. Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations, NIST Special Publication 800-146. Lee Badger, Tim Grance, Robert Patt-Corner and Jeff Voas, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 2012, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-146.pdf
  3. NIST Cloud Computing Reference Architecture, NIST Special Publication 500-292. Fang Liu and others, National Institute of Standards and Technology, September 2011, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication500-292.pdf
  4. Shared Responsibility Model. Amazon Web Services, viewed 8 November 2026. https://aws.amazon.com/compliance/shared-responsibility-model/
  5. Data, privacy, and security for Foundry Models sold by Azure in Microsoft Foundry. Microsoft Learn, updated 5 June 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/foundry/responsible-ai/openai/data-privacy
  6. Foundry Models sold by Azure abuse monitoring. Microsoft Learn, updated 19 May 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/foundry/openai/concepts/abuse-monitoring
  7. Data protection, Amazon Bedrock User Guide. Amazon Web Services, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/data-protection.html
  8. Data retention, Amazon Bedrock User Guide. Amazon Web Services, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/data-retention.html
  9. Monitor model invocation using CloudWatch Logs and Amazon S3, Amazon Bedrock User Guide. Amazon Web Services, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-invocation-logging.html
  10. Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform and zero data retention. Google Cloud Documentation, last updated 7 November 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/resources/zero-data-retention
  11. Data controls in the OpenAI platform. OpenAI, viewed 8 November 2026. https://developers.openai.com/api/docs/guides/your-data
  12. Amazon EC2 Dedicated Instances, Amazon EC2 User Guide. Amazon Web Services, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/dedicated-instance.html
  13. What is AWS Outposts? AWS Outposts User Guide. Amazon Web Services, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.aws.amazon.com/outposts/latest/userguide/what-is-outposts.html
  14. Equinix, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2025. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, filed 11 February 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1101239/000110123926000032/eqix-20251231.htm
  15. CoreWeave, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended 31 December 2025. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, filed 2 March 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1769628/000176962826000104/crwv-20251231.htm
  16. About Google Distributed Cloud air-gapped. Google Cloud Documentation, last updated 26 October 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.cloud.google.com/distributed-cloud/hosted/docs/latest/gdcag/overview
  17. Run Gemini anywhere, including on-premises, with Google Distributed Cloud. Vithal Shirodkar, Google Cloud Blog, 28 August 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/hybrid-cloud/gemini-is-now-available-anywhere
  18. Deploying AI Systems Securely: Best Practices for Deploying Secure and Resilient AI Systems, U/OO/143395-24, PP-24-1538, version 1.0. NSA Artificial Intelligence Security Center, CISA, FBI, ASD's ACSC, CCCS, NCSC-NZ and NCSC-UK, April 2024 (copy hosted by the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center), viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2024/240415.pdf
  19. Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 2024, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf
  20. Pickle Scanning, Hub documentation. Hugging Face, viewed 8 November 2026. https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/security-pickle
  21. Security, vLLM documentation. vLLM project, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.vllm.ai/en/latest/usage/security.html
  22. Engine Arguments, vLLM documentation. vLLM project, viewed 8 November 2026. https://docs.vllm.ai/en/latest/configuration/engine_args.html
  23. Llama 3.1 Community License Agreement. Meta, version release date 23 July 2024, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.llama.com/llama3_1/license/

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