ExplainerSI evaluation

Questions to ask before you deploy a vendor's agent

Questions to ask an agent vendor about testing: model versions, test sets, repeated runs, escalation, prompt injection, logs and who tested, with a public source behind each.

Cover of the full report: Questions to ask before you deploy a vendor's agent
The research behind this article, with every source listed. 18 pages.

Key points

From the Summary of the full report

  1. In the 2025 AI Agent Index, which documented 30 deployed agents from public information as of 31 December 2025, 25 disclosed no internal safety results and 23 had no third-party testing information [2, 3].
  2. Of the 13 agents in the 2025 AI Agent Index with frontier levels of autonomy, 4 disclosed any agentic safety evaluations, and developers shared far more about capabilities than about safety practices [1].
  3. A model version change can move results. The March and June 2023 versions of one widely used hosted model scored 84% and 51% at telling prime from composite numbers [20].
  4. One run per test case hides inconsistency. An agent that succeeds 75% of the time passes all three of three runs about 42% of the time [26], and in the retail domain of one 2024 customer-service benchmark the best agent's chance of passing all eight of eight runs, averaged over tasks, was under 25% [17].
  5. Repeated attacks find more. In NIST's 2025 agent hijacking evaluations, attempting each prompt injection attack 25 times raised the average success rate from 57% to 80% [8].

The questions to ask an agent vendor about testing come down to seven: which model and version the agent runs on, which test cases it passed, how many times each case ran, when it stops and asks a person, how it held up against prompt injection, what its logs record and who did the testing. Each comes below with what a good answer contains and the public text behind it. This explainer is research, never legal advice.

The evidence is rarely public. The 2025 AI Agent Index documented 30 deployed agents from public information and developer correspondence, as of 31 December 2025 [1, 3]. Of the 30, 25 disclosed no internal safety results and 23 had no third-party testing information [2, 3]. Of the 13 agents with frontier levels of autonomy, 4 disclosed any agentic safety evaluations [1]. For most agents in the index, a buyer who wants test evidence has to ask for it.

Questions to ask an agent vendor about testing

Question A good answer contains Sources
Which model and version, and what happens when it changes? A pinned version in the logs, notice before changes, regression results on the new version [20, 26, 29]
Which test set, with what known answers? Cases like your tasks, answers fixed in advance, a setting close to production [6, 19, 30, 32]
How many runs per case? Several trials per case, a result that counts every trial, error bars [7, 17, 26]
When does it escalate, refuse or ask for approval? Written handoff rules, cases where stopping is correct, approval before high-impact actions [10, 12, 17]
How was it tested for prompt injection? Direct and indirect attacks, adaptive attacks, several attempts each, results per task [8, 9, 18]
What do the logs record? Model version, tool calls with arguments and results, approvals, a stated retention period [12, 28, 29]
Who did the testing? Testers apart from the developers, results you can read, a contract right to evaluate [3, 5, 6]

Which model and version, and what happens when it changes

An agent is a model with prompts, tools and settings around it, and any of them can change after you sign. In 2023, the March and June versions of one widely used hosted model scored 84% and 51% at telling prime from composite numbers [20]. The Guidelines for secure AI system development, published in November 2023 by UK and US government agencies with international partners, ask providers to treat major updates like new versions and to help users evaluate model changes, for example with preview access and versioned APIs [29].

A good answer names the model family and the pinned version, says how much notice comes before a change and shows a regression suite rerun on each new version. A January 2026 guide from one model provider describes regression evals that "should have a nearly 100% pass rate", with automated evals run on each agent change and model upgrade [26]. NIST AI 600-1, which is voluntary, suggests that vendor contracts consider "GAI system changes over time (e.g., fine-tuning, drift, decay)" [5].

Which test set, with what known answers

Ask what the test cases were, who fixed their answers and how close they are to your work. The NIST AI RMF asks that test sets and metrics be documented and that performance be shown "for conditions similar to deployment setting(s)" [6]. Singapore's Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI recommends testing whole workflows in an environment that "mirrors production as closely as possible" [30].

A headline figure can come from the wrong data. The FTC alleged that a content detector marketed as "98 percent" accurate scored 53 percent on general-purpose content in testing, and that its model had been trained or fine-tuned to classify academic content [32]. A 2025 study found task and grading flaws in agent benchmarks that can misestimate performance by up to 100% in relative terms [19]. What agent benchmarks measure explains why a public score says little about your own tasks.

A good answer lists cases built from tasks like yours, answers fixed before the runs, cases kept out of the agent's development and the grading rule for each.

How many runs per case

An agent can give different results on the same input. At 75% success per trial, it passes all three of three trials about 42% of the time [26]. On tau-bench, a 2024 customer-service benchmark, "state-of-the-art function calling agents" succeeded on under 50% of tasks, and in its retail domain the best agent's chance of passing all eight of eight trials of a task, averaged over tasks, was under 25% [17]. NIST's January 2026 draft on benchmark evaluations says that repeating each item "can reduce uncertainty of evaluation results" and asks for statistics with estimated uncertainties [7].

A good answer gives the number of trials per case, error bars and a result that counts every trial, such as pass^k, the chance that all k trials of a task succeed, averaged across tasks [17]. Agent evaluation metrics sets out how pass^k and consistency scores are computed.

When the agent escalates, refuses or asks for approval

Escalation can be tested only once the right action is written down. tau-bench's airline policy tells the agent to transfer the user to a human agent "if and only if the request cannot be handled within the scope of your actions" [17]. OWASP's entry on excessive agency recommends that a person approve high-impact actions before they are taken and that downstream systems enforce authorization [10]. The 2025 Index found that users configure enterprise agents at autonomy Level 1 to 2, while deployed agents often run at Level 3 to 5, triggered by events without human involvement [1].

A good answer shows written rules for handoff and approval, and results on cases where stopping or asking is correct and on cases where proceeding is. For high-risk systems, Article 14 of the EU AI Act asks that overseers can override or reverse the output and interrupt the system through a "stop" button or a similar procedure [12].

How the agent was tested for prompt injection

OWASP describes direct injection through a user's own prompt and indirect injection through outside content such as websites or files, and says it is unclear whether fool-proof prevention exists [9]. In NIST's 2025 agent hijacking evaluations, attempting each attack 25 times raised the average attack success rate from 57% to 80%, and new attacks developed with red teamers reached 81% success on held-out tasks, against 11% for the top baseline attack [8]. A 2025 study bypassed 12 recent defenses with attack success above 90% for most, though most of them had first reported near-zero rates [18].

A good answer names every channel the agent reads, the attack set and its date, adaptive attacks written against the agent's own defenses, several attempts per attack and results per task [8, 18]. Prompt injection testing covers the method in detail.

What the logs record

OpenTelemetry's conventions for recording tool calls require the tool's name, while a call's arguments and results are opt-in [28], so a log that follows the defaults can show which tool ran without what went in or came back. The 2023 guidelines ask providers to give customers high-quality audit logs at no extra charge [29]. In a 2025 study, log inspection found agents searching for the benchmark instead of solving the task, and misusing credit cards in flight-booking tasks [24].

For high-risk systems, the EU AI Act requires that systems allow automatic logging and has deployers keep the logs under their control for at least six months [12]. MCP access control covers logging and permissions at the tool layer.

Who did the testing

The 2025 Index documented third-party testing for 3 of its 30 agents [3]. NIST AI 600-1 suggests verifying that people running structured human feedback exercises are not directly involved in developing the same model, writing contract clauses that let an organization evaluate third-party processes and evaluating capability claims "using empirically validated methods" [5]. The FTC alleged that one legal service did not test whether it performed at the level of a human lawyer, and the final order the FTC announced in February 2025 requires $193,000 in monetary relief [31]. In 2024, a British Columbia tribunal held an airline responsible for what its website chatbot told a customer [33].

A good answer names who tested, how they were kept apart from the developers, which version they tested and where you can read the results, with a contract clause that lets you test too. Rillor's agent evaluation work tests the agents an organization plans to deploy on its own tasks, with black-box logging and replayable runs.

What the EU AI Act asks of the deployer

For high-risk systems, Article 26 asks deployers to use the system under its instructions for use, assign oversight to people with the necessary competence, training and authority, monitor its operation and keep its logs [12]. Article 13 asks that the instructions state the level of accuracy the system was tested and validated against [12]. Ask for those instructions before you sign. Under the consolidated text after the 2026 Digital Omnibus on AI, these provisions apply from 2 December 2027 for high-risk systems under Annex III and from 2 August 2028 for those under Annex I [13, 15].

Read the full report

The full report adds the evidence behind each question, the 2025 AI Agent Index figures, the deployer duties in the EU AI Act, a mapping of the questions to NIST, OWASP and EU AI Act items, and all 33 sources.

The full report

Questions to ask before you deploy a vendor's agent

The research behind this article, with every source listed. 18 pages.

  1. Summary
  2. Background
  3. Method
  4. Findings
  5. Implications
  6. Limits of this analysis
  7. Sources

Sources

  1. The 2025 AI Agent Index. AI Agent Index project, MIT, 2025 edition, viewed 8 November 2026. https://aiagentindex.mit.edu/
  2. Further Details, 2025 AI Agent Index. AI Agent Index project, MIT, 2025 edition, viewed 8 November 2026. https://aiagentindex.mit.edu/2025/further-details
  3. The 2025 AI Agent Index: Documenting Technical and Safety Features of Deployed Agentic AI Systems. Leon Staufer, Kevin Feng, Kevin Wei, Luke Bailey and others, arXiv:2602.17753, version 2, 6 May 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.17753
  4. Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile, NIST AI 600-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, July 2024, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf
  5. Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0), NIST AI 100-1. National Institute of Standards and Technology, January 2023, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.100-1.pdf
  6. Practices for Automated Benchmark Evaluations of Language Models, NIST AI 800-2, Initial Public Draft. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Center for AI Standards and Innovation, January 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.800-2.ipd.pdf
  7. Technical Blog: Strengthening AI Agent Hijacking Evaluations. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Center for AI Standards and Innovation, 17 January 2025, updated 19 December 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2025/01/technical-blog-strengthening-ai-agent-hijacking-evaluations
  8. LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025. OWASP GenAI Security Project, 2025 edition, viewed 8 November 2026. https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/
  9. LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025. OWASP GenAI Security Project, 2025 edition, viewed 8 November 2026. https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/
  10. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act). Publications Office of the European Union, EUR-Lex, Official Journal L, 12 July 2024, viewed 8 November 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=OJ:L_202401689
  11. Article 113: Entry into force and application. European Commission, AI Act Service Desk, text based on the EUR-Lex consolidated version as at 27 July 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/article-113
  12. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 July 2026 amending Regulations (EU) 2024/1689, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2023/1230 as regards the simplification of the implementation of harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Digital Omnibus on AI). Publications Office of the European Union, EUR-Lex, Official Journal L, 24 July 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202601744
  13. τ-bench: A Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interaction in Real-World Domains. Shunyu Yao, Noah Shinn, Pedram Razavi and Karthik Narasimhan, arXiv:2406.12045, 17 June 2024, viewed 8 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.12045
  14. The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections. Milad Nasr, Nicholas Carlini, Chawin Sitawarin and others, arXiv:2510.09023, 10 October 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.09023
  15. Establishing Best Practices for Building Rigorous Agentic Benchmarks. Yuxuan Zhu, Tengjun Jin, Yada Pruksachatkun and others, arXiv:2507.02825, version 5, 7 August 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.02825
  16. How is ChatGPT's behavior changing over time? Lingjiao Chen, Matei Zaharia and James Zou, arXiv:2307.09009, version 3, 31 October 2023, viewed 8 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09009
  17. Holistic Agent Leaderboard: The Missing Infrastructure for AI Agent Evaluation. Sayash Kapoor, Benedikt Stroebl, Peter Kirgis and others, arXiv:2510.11977, 13 October 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.11977
  18. Demystifying evals for AI agents. Anthropic, 9 January 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.anthropic.com/research/demystifying-evals-for-ai-agents
  19. Semantic conventions for generative AI tool execution (execute-tool.md). OpenTelemetry, semantic-conventions-genai repository on GitHub, status Development, viewed 8 November 2026. https://github.com/open-telemetry/semantic-conventions-genai/blob/main/docs/gen-ai/execute-tool.md
  20. Guidelines for secure AI system development. UK National Cyber Security Centre, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and international partners, 27 November 2023, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Guidelines-for-secure-AI-system-development.pdf
  21. Model AI Governance Framework for Agentic AI, Version 1.5. Infocomm Media Development Authority, Singapore, 20 May 2026, updated 5 June 2026, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.imda.gov.sg/-/media/imda/files/about/emerging-tech-and-research/artificial-intelligence/mgf-for-agentic-ai.pdf
  22. FTC Finalizes Order with DoNotPay That Prohibits Deceptive 'AI Lawyer' Claims, Imposes Monetary Relief, and Requires Notice to Past Subscribers. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 11 February 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/02/ftc-finalizes-order-donotpay-prohibits-deceptive-ai-lawyer-claims-imposes-monetary-relief-requires
  23. FTC Order Requires Workado to Back Up Artificial Intelligence Detection Claims. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 28 April 2025, viewed 8 November 2026. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/04/ftc-order-requires-workado-back-artificial-intelligence-detection-claims
  24. Moffatt v. Air Canada, 2024 BCCRT 149. Civil Resolution Tribunal of British Columbia, 14 February 2024, viewed 8 November 2026. https://decisions.civilresolutionbc.ca/crt/crtd/en/item/525448/index.do

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